Hereditary Genius
143
in Spain against the Carthaginians. Wellington broke the Mahratta
power aet. 35, and had won Waterloo aet. 46.
But though the profession of arms in time of prolonged war affords
ample opportunities to men of high military genius, it is otherwise in
peace, or in short wars. The army, in every country, is more directly
under the influence of the sovereign than any other institution. Guided
by the instinct of self-preservation, the patronage of the army is
always the last privilege that sovereigns are disposed to yield to
democratic demands. Hence it is, that armies invariably suffer from
those evils that are inseparable from courtly patronage. Rank and
political services are apt to be weighed against military ability, and
incapable officers to occupy high places during periods of peace.
They may even be able to continue to fill their posts during short wars
without creating a public scandal; nay, sometimes to carry away
honours that ought in justice to have been bestowed on their more
Capable subordinates in rank.
It is therefore very necessary, in accepting the reputation of a
commander as a test of his gifts, to confine ourselves, as I propose to
do, to those commanders only whose reputation has been tested by
prolonged wars, or whose ascendency over other men has been
freely acknowledged.
There is a singular and curious condition of success in the army and
navy, quite independent of ability, that deserves a few words. In
order that a young man may fight his way to the top of his profession,
he must survive many battles. But it so happens that men of equal
ability are not equally likely to escape shot free. Before explaining
why, let me remark that the danger of being shot in battle is
considerable. No less than seven of the thirty-two commanders
mentioned in my appendix, or between one-quarter and one-fifth of
them, perished in that way; they are Charles XII., Gustavus
Adolphus, Sir